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Baroness Cox’s six-year campaign to address the plight of British Muslim women was dealt 
a mighty blow on 11 March 2016. The date had marked a historic occasion for Cox and her 
supporters. Her private member’s bill had been scheduled to receive its first ever debate in 
the House of Commons, after failing to pass through the House of Lords four times in a row 
since it was first introduced in 2011. Due to a busy parliamentary timetable, however, it 
was not discussed. In light of the current public review of Shariah tribunals (the first ever 
of its kind), it is a pertinent opportunity to reflect on the rise and fall of Cox’s bill since its 
introduction in 2011, particularly since it has been reintroduced for the 6th consecutive time 
in the current parliamentary session.1  
The Nature and Function of Private Members’ Bills  
The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill is a private member’s bill first 
introduced by Baroness Cox in 2011 which concerns religious tribunals in general and 
Shariah tribunals in particular. Before embarking upon an analysis of the bill, it is first 
necessary to clarify the nature of private members’ bills, so that the long political process 
which Baroness Cox’s bill has had to undergo since 2011 can be properly understood.2 Most 
successful bills are those which are introduced and promoted by the government of the 
day.3 A private member’s bill is one promoted by an individual Member of Parliament, as 
opposed to the government.4 Such bills usually involve sensitive issues of particular 
interest to their promoters.5 Only a very small minority of Private Members’ Bills actually 
reach the statute book. This is because they are allocated a very minimal amount of time 
in the parliamentary time-table. The only way that they can realistically succeed is for the 
government to make additional time for such bills to complete their parliamentary stages.6  
In practice therefore, a private member’s will not get through without the support, or at 
least the “benevolent neutrality” of the government.7 Moreover a bill which is introduced in 
the House of Lords has an even smaller chance of success.8 This is because most Private 
Members’ Bills are introduced in the House of Commons, and bills introduced in the Lords 
will only be considered after Bills introduced in the Commons.9 These bureaucratic hurdles 
explain why Baroness Cox’s bill has failed to reach the House of Commons four times 
consecutively since 2011, with the bill finally breaking through in the 2015-2016 
parliamentary session after Baroness Cox had reintroduced the bill in the House of Lords 
for the fifth year in a row. In three of these four failed attempts, the bill did not even 
manage to receive a second reading, which is usually the point at which the bill is debated 
by the house for the first time and inspected by the government.10 
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The Academic and Political Background of Baroness Cox 
Baroness Cox is described by a fellow House of Lords member as a “rare breed”.11 A 
qualified nurse with degrees in both sociology and law, Cox has enjoyed a successful career 
in academia and politics, authoring several books spanning a range of topics including 
religion, law, politics and sociology. As president of Christian Solidarity Worldwide she 
became renowned for leading humanitarian campaigns in conflict zones such as Armenia, 
Sudan, Nigeria and Indonesia, earning her the title “a voice for the voiceless”.12 The bill in 
question is in fact the result of another campaign which the Baroness has personally taken 
upon herself, this time addressing the plight of British Muslim women whose suffering she 
believes would “make the suffragettes turn in their graves.”13 From a broader perspective, 
the bill is also an attempt by Cox to stem what she describes as “the creeping 
implementation of Sharia law in this country”.14 These two factors were highlighted by Cox 
as forming the central rationale of the bill: 
“I’m bringing this Bill before Parliament for four reasons. First because in this country we 
have a commitment to equality [and] to combat any forms of gender discrimination, 
gender inequality, and Shari’a law is inherently discriminatory against women, so it does 
not actually have a place in this country, in family matters particularly. Secondly, women 
are really suffering as a result of the provisions of Shari’a law, for example polygamy. In 
Shari’a law a man can divorce a wife very easily. This happens quite frequently. Women are 
just divorced, and left, if they haven’t had a civilly registered marriage, without any legal 
redress. The husband goes and marries another wife, brings her back to this country, and 
enjoys that relationship, and divorce again. And then a third marriage, a third divorce. We 
don’t allow bigamy in this country, why are we allowing polygamy, and women are 
suffering, and that’s the second point.”15 
Despite this particular rationale, the bill’s actual text makes no explicit mention of Shariah 
tribunals or Islamic law. It is instead framed as a provision about mediation and arbitration 
services in general, with the particular aim of ensuring that such services conform to 
equality legislation.  
The Provisions of the Bill  
The bill begins with the following introduction: 
“A bill to make further provision about arbitration and mediation services and the 
application of equality legislation to such services; to make provision about the protection 
of victims of domestic abuse; and for connected purposes.”16 
The focus on arbitration and mediation services is based on Baroness Cox’s belief that the 
central problem with Shariah tribunals is their abuse of the Arbitration Act 1996. This is 
being done according to Baroness Cox in several ways. Some tribunals like the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal “are operating legitimately” under the Arbitration Act, but are 
“operating discriminatory procedures during the proceedings.”17 Thus for example the 
resolution of inheritance disputes in the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal is based on the 
premise that a woman deserves half the inheritance of the man.18 Other “arbitration” 
tribunals such as the Islamic Shariah Council are operating outside the framework of the 
Arbitration Act by deciding cases relating to family law and criminal law.19 Shariah tribunals 
are also abusing their powers under the Arbitration Act by “coercing Muslim women into 
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agreeing arbitration” when the arbitration process ought in fact to be a voluntary process 
with consent from both parties.20 
The bill is split up into five main parts. Part one makes amendments to the Equality Act 
2010 with the purpose of ensuring in the words of Baroness Cox “that tribunals operating 
legitimately under the Arbitration Act 1996 cannot use discriminatory Sharia rules such as 
a woman’s testimony being worth half that of a man.”21 To this end Part 1 inserts a 
subsection into the Equality Act which specifically outlaws arbitration services which 
“proceed on the assumption that a woman has fewer property rights than a man.”22 Part 1 
also places a duty on public authorities to ensure that Muslim women in polygamous 
households or religious marriages are made aware of their legal rights. This duty is based 
on Baroness Cox’s concern that Muslim women are unware of the legal protections 
provided by the civil registration of marriage and suffer as a consequence.23 Part 2 makes 
amendments to the Arbitration Act 1996 which simply affirm the amendments made in Part 
1, namely that an Arbitration Agreement cannot contain a term which provides that women 
should have fewer property rights than men. Part 3 makes amendments to the Family Law 
Act 1996 which enhance a judge’s power to set aside court orders based on negotiated 
agreements in which “one party’s consent was not genuine”.24 These amendments target 
the issue of consent in agreements drafted by Shariah tribunals in which the Muslim 
woman’s consent “is open to serious challenge”.25 In this regard Part 3 also empowers third 
parties to apply for the court order to be struck down, so that “even women who do not 
dare take this step themselves can be protected.”26  
Part 4 makes an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which 
emphasises that a victim of domestic abuse is a witness to an offence and therefore should 
be protected from intimidation. This is designed to protect Muslim women who come 
forward to report domestic abuse which they are suffering.27 Part 5 makes an amendment 
to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 which creates a new legal offence of “falsely 
claiming legal jurisdiction”.28 This is aimed to prevent Shariah tribunals from claiming legal 
jurisdiction in disputes outside the remit of the Arbitration Act such as family and criminal 
disputes.29 The maximum penalty for committing such an offence is set as seven years.30 
As the preceding analysis illustrates, the bill is comprehensive in its scope and outlook. It 
seeks to amend five different Acts of Parliament with sophisticated provisions dealing with 
a range of legal issues including gender discrimination, domestic abuse and unlawful 
duress. Indeed while the focus of the bill is clearly the regulation of services provided by 
Shariah tribunals, it is not limited to this objective. The bill also contains provisions which 
address the plight of Muslim women more generally and which are unrelated to Shariah 
tribunals. The duty placed on public authorities in Part 2 for example clearly seeks to 
enhance the legal rights of Muslim women through education and awareness, while the 
provision on domestic abuse in Part 4 is a practical attempt to provide extra protection for 
Muslim women suffering from domestic abuse. The bill should thus be viewed as a 
comprehensive response to the plight of British Muslim women rather than simply an 
attempt to limit the jurisdiction of Shariah tribunals. This is the case with regards to the 
actual provisions of the bill, as well as the intensive public campaign which has 
accompanied the bill.  
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Support for the Bill  
In the process of promoting her bill, Baroness Cox has facilitated the publication of several 
reports which support the provisions of the bill.31  One of these reports highlights the issues 
which British Muslim women face as a result of their marriage and makes no mention 
whatsoever of Shariah tribunals. 32  Two other reports on the other hand are direct 
responses to publications by the Islamic Shariah Tribunal which challenge the bill. 33 
Baroness Cox has also garnered the support of a diverse array non-governmental 
organisations and public institutions hailing from a variety of religious, political and social 
backgrounds. Thus for example supporters of the bill include Christians, Muslims, Jews, 
secularists and feminists.34 The bill has also received strong support from the media.35 One 
of the main reasons the bill has been able to garner strong support from such a diverse 
array of groups is due to its comprehensive objective of protecting a vulnerable group 
within society, as opposed to a more limited objective of simply limiting the jurisdiction of 
Shariah tribunals.  
The Bill’s Rise and Fall in Parliament  
Alongside the support of the public, Baroness Cox crucially required the backing of the 
government for her bill to have any chance of passing through the parliamentary process. 
In the first year in which it was introduced, the bill did not even receive enough 
parliamentary time for a second reading, indicating from the outset that it did not have 
support from the government. This was confirmed in 2012, when the bill managed to 
receive a second reading for the first time and thus be subject to a debate in the House of 
Lords.  The bill unsurprisingly received warm support from the majority of the house. The 
Lord Bishop of Manchester however expressed caution about the practicality of the bill’s 
provisions, questioning whether the issues which the bill raised really needed fresh 
legislation.36 Baroness Uddin, the only Muslim member of the house to contribute to the 
debate, also noted concern that the bill’s particular focus on Shariah tribunals had led to 
the perception that it was “another assault on the Muslims”.37  
After listening to the all the contributions from the House, Lord Gardiner responded on 
behalf of the government. He praised the bill’s noble objective of supporting the rights of 
women and ensuring all citizens enjoy the same rights. He noted however that the 
government had “reservations” about whether the bill was “the best way forward” in 
tackling the issues concerning British Muslim women. The first major objection which the 
government had about the bill was its prohibition of arbitration according to religious 
principles, something which the government stated the Arbitration Act specifically sought 
to facilitate:  
“Couples, communities and other groups have the option to use arbitration and to apply 
religious considerations. For example, the Jewish Beth Din has long been recognised as 
able to conduct arbitrations applying Jewish law considerations. The Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal, established in 2007, provides an alternative route to resolve civil law disputes in 
accordance with Sharia principles. In both cases this is because the Arbitration Act 1996 
allows parties to an arbitration to agree any system of law or rules, other than national 
laws, to be applied by the arbitral tribunal. Crucially, both parties must freely have agreed 
to arbitration and to the use of religious principles. Even where religious law considerations 
have been applied to an arbitration, the resulting decisions are subject to review by the 
national courts on a number of grounds, including whether the agreement was freely 
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concluded.”38 
This is indeed a major shortcoming of the bill. If two parties are both genuinely happy to 
have their dispute arbitrated according to religious principles despite the discriminatory 
nature of such principles, the bill would still prohibit such arbitration. Such a prohibition 
conflicts with a central premise of the Arbitration Act, namely the freedom for two parties 
to have their dispute arbitrated according to any religious principles which they so wish.  
The second major objection which the government had about the bill was that the issues 
which it sought to address were in fact already addressed by existing legislation. The 
Arbitration Act already stipulated that tribunals must act fairly and impartially, as well as 
stipulating that arbitration awards can be challenged in court if such a duty is breached or 
if there is any other irregularity.39 The amendments made in Part 1 and 2 of the bill to the 
Equality Act and the Arbitration Act were therefore unnecessary. 40  The proposed 
amendments to the Family Law Act in Part 3 were also unnecessary as contracts are 
already deemed unenforceable in English contract law if made under duress.41 Section 51 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act already made it an offence to intimidate victims 
of domestic violence, rendering the amendment suggested in Part 4 redundant.42 Finally 
the new criminal offence suggested in part 5 was deemed unnecessary by the government 
because “Sharia councils and other religious councils have no jurisdiction in this country, 
therefore any decision they make can never be legally binding.”43 For these reasons Lord 
Gardiner concluded that “increased awareness requires changes to society, not changes to 
the law.”44 In this regard he noted that the government was already working with local 
bodies to increase awareness of the legal consequences of religious-only marriages, a 
matter which Part 2 of the bill had sought to address.  
This stance of the government explains why the bill failed to receive a second reading in 
both 2013 and 2014. When it did manage to receive a second reading once again in 2015, 
the government adamantly maintained its position, stating: 
“While we agree entirely with the noble Baroness that the necessary standards and 
safeguards must be in place, at the moment we do not agree that the law needs changing 
to facilitate this, because relevant and specific protections are already in place in common 
law and in existing legislation.”45 
This position was maintained despite some changes which Baroness Cox had made to the 
bill. These changes crucially included the removal of a clause which had stipulated that 
family law matters cannot be subject to arbitration proceedings.46 The government also 
announced in this response some initiatives which it had recently undertaken to tackle the 
issue of domestic violence, including a new offence of “coercive or controlling behaviour” 
which had been inserted into the Serious Crime Act 2015 to ensure that “manipulative or 
controlling perpetrators who cause their loved ones to live in fear will face justice for their 
actions.”47 Despite the government’s response, the bill managed to pass through the 
House of Lords, and received its first ever reading in the House of Commons on 11 February 
2016. Unsurprisingly however, it failed to receive its second reading scheduled on 11 March 
2016, terminating the bill’s progress for the 2015-2016 parliament session.  
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Shortcomings of the Bill and an Alternative Solution 
Alongside the two shortcomings of the bill specifically pointed out by the government, there 
is also another major weakness which the bill suffers from which the government failed to 
note. This is the bill’s assumption that the majority of Shariah tribunals operate under the 
Arbitration Act. As the government itself has affirmed, the truth is directly to the 
contrary.48 Most tribunals do not operate at all under the Arbitration Act, since the vast 
majority of their work relates to Islamic divorce which is outside the remit of the Arbitration 
Act.49 Those tribunals which do operate under the Arbitration Act do so in a very small 
minority of cases. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal is an exception to this rule.  
The bill is therefore “misplaced” in its focus on arbitration and mediation services, as 
Sandberg notes.50 To bypass this shortcoming, Sandberg and Cranmer have drafted an 
alternative form of the bill which they suggest could regulate Shariah tribunals more 
appropriately.51 Titled the “Non-Statutory Courts and Tribunals (Consent to Jurisdiction) 
Bill”, this bill shifts the focus to concerns about the genuineness of consent in Shariah 
tribunals, which the authors believe is in fact the central issue related to Shariah 
tribunals.52 Like Baroness Cox’s bill, this bill also addresses concerns that Shariah tribunals 
illegally claim jurisdiction in criminal and family matters. To these ends the bill creates 
statutory offences for exercising judicial jurisdiction without a person’s consent and for 
falsely claiming jurisdiction in matters of crime and in cases involving children. One 
note-worthy characteristic of this bill is that it incorporates the sophisticated framework of 
consent found in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which provides a statutory definition of 
consent buttressed by the use of conclusive and rebuttable presumptions.53  
Despite its valuable attempt to remedy a shortcoming in Baroness Cox’s bill, this bill as it 
stands still suffers itself from various shortcomings. Qualitative studies of Shariah tribunal 
users have not highlighted consent as an issue which is empirically proven. On the 
contrary, such studies found that Muslim women were empowered by the services provided 
by the tribunals.54 One of the main issues which such studies did highlight was the process 
of reconciliation administered by the tribunals, which were shown at times to cause 
unwarranted distress for the individuals involved. For this reason, a discourse on ways in 
which such procedures could be amended and improved would be much more pertinent 
and valuable. Moreover, one of the main functions of both Jewish and Islamic tribunals is to 
emancipate women who are purposefully chained in their marriage by oppressive 
husbands. This function necessarily involves the coercion of the husbands in many cases to 
cooperate in the proceedings. Such a bill may make tribunals reluctant to place pressure on 
their clients in such situations out of fear of prosecution. Oppressive husbands could also 
use the bill (once hypothetically enacted) to ensure their wives do not obtain the religious 
divorce which they desperately need by claiming they did not consent to the decision of the 
religious tribunal. As for the clauses concerning the claim of false legal jurisdiction in 
marital and criminal disputes, it is highly questionable whether these are necessary given 
the clear precedent that already exists in the law on the matter, as the government 
correctly pointed out in its response to Baroness Cox’s bill.  
To conclude, while Baroness Cox’s bill may have strong public support, the unfortunate 
reality of the parliamentary process is that it needs the backing of the Government. Unless 
Cox can show government that her bill positively compliments existing legislation, it is 
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highly unlikely that she will succeed in making it law. 
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